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CHAPTER 12 
Criminal Law, Procedure, and 
Administration 
WILBUR G. HOLLINGSWORTH 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§12.1. Admissibility of photographs: Prejudicial evidence and the 
discretion of trial judges. Two opportunities to pass on the admissi-
bility of photographs in criminal cases were presented the Supreme 
Judicial Court during the 1956 SURVEY year. In the widely publicized 
case of Commonwealth v. Makarewicz,l the defendant assigned as error, 
among others, the admission into evidence of several "enlarged color 
photographs produced upon a screen," 2 illustrating testimony of a 
pathologist.s The defendant objected to the use and introduction of 
the colored slides as exhibits because of their inflammatory and pre-
judicial nature. The Supreme Judicial Court rather summarily re-
jected this contention, holding that the admission of the photographs 
'was a matter of discretion with the trial court. 
The scope of appellate review of the admissibility of photographs, 
even if enlarged or in color, seems very limited. The Court pointed 
out that "no question is raised as to the identification of the slides or 
as to their being fair representations of the conditions which the 
pathologist discovered in the autopsy." 4 And the Court asserted that 
"their admissibility has been disposed of by a long line of cases which 
are cited in Commonwealth v. Gray, 314 Mass. 96, 98." 5 The possible 
problem of the enlargement of the photographs as bearing on their 
WILBUR G. HOLLINGSWORTH is a member of the Massachusetts Bar and Chief Coun· 
sel, Voluntary Defenders Committee. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the aid given by John J. Curtin, Jr., Chairman 
of the Board of Student Editors, in general supervision of the chapter. Mr. Curtin 
is indebted to the following members of the Board of Student Editors for their aid: 
Thomas J. Crowley in §12.3, James F. Stapleton in §12.4, and Donald J. Manning 
in §12.7. 
§12.1. 1333 Mass. 575, 132 N.E.2d 294 (1956). See also §§22.2 and 22.7, infra, for 
further discussion of this case. 
2333 Mass. at 579, 132 N.E.2d at 297. 
S The illustrated testimony included that "there was a laceration in the vagina 
although the hymen was intact. The anus was dilated and spermatozoa were pres-
ent in the rectum." Ibid. 
4333 Mass. at 584, 132 N.E.2d at 299. 
Ii Ibid. 
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§12.1 CRIMINAL LAW 109 
prejudicial nature was disposed of with a reference to Wigmore6 and 
to Commonwealth v. Noxon.7 The Noxon case held that where there 
is evidence from which a judge may find sufficient verification of the en-
largements, that they are fair representations, and that the photographs 
will aid the jury in understanding the issues, they may be admitted. 
The Court in the Makarewicz case expanded the Noxon rule so that 
the trial judge's broad discretion to admit ordinary photographs8 
exists also where the photographs are color enlargements. If the 
Noxon rule is the sole test, apparently the only requirement as to the 
relevancy of photographs which an appellate court will impose in 
Massachusetts is that photographs aid the jury in understanding the 
issues. In the Makarewicz case, although this was not spelled out by 
the Court, the color slides might be said to aid the jury in understand-
ing the nature of the crime and thus in inferring what motives 
prompted the murder. The slides, by this interpretration, fulfill the 
admissibility requirements of the Supreme Judicial Court under the 
Noxon rule, now applicable to photographs in color. 
The problem of giving all relevant data to the jury and yet not 
unduly exposing them to material likely to result in emotional rather 
than logical reactions is a serious one in criminal cases. If a jury 
views in color, in a dimly lighted courtroom, projected slides enlarging 
mutilations of a young girl's body, such a vivid experience may impress 
them with a desire to make someone pay for so heinous a crime. The 
only person over whom the jury has any power is the defendant: and 
we can only speculate as to the effect of this emotional reaction on 
the proper execution by the jury of their duty to determine impartially 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
During the 1956 SURVEY year, a related problem of admissibility of 
photographs came before the Court in Commonwealth v. Valcourt. 9 
The defendant was charged with arson. He argued that because he had 
admitted the fact of the fire, and because the jury had taken a view 
of the premises, photographs of the burned building should have 
been excluded by the trial judge. The Supreme Judicial Court held 
that there was no error in admitting the photographs. "The photo-
graphs of the burned building were plainly admissible to aid the jury 
in understanding the nature of the fire even though they had viewed 
the premises." 10 The Court then asserted, "Despite the admissions of 
the defendants with respect to the fire, the Commonwealth was entitled 
to prove its case." 11 
An interesting opinion to read in connection with the Valcourt and 
Makarewicz approaches is the 1956 Florida Supreme Court decision of 
63 Wigmore on Evidence §795 (3d ed. 1940). 
7319 Mass. 495, 536·537, 66 N.E.2d 814, 840 (1946). 
8 See, for example, Gilbert v. West End Ry., 160 Mass. 403, 36 N.E. 60 (1894), 
sustaining the trial judge's refusal to admit the photographs; Swart v. Boston, 288 
Mass. 542, 193 N.E. 360 (1943), sustaining the trial judge's admission of photographs. 
9333 Mass. 706, 133 N.E.2d 217 (1956). 
10333 Mass. at 712, 133 N.E.2d at 222. 
11 Ibid. 
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Dyken v. Florida,12 a case which, in general, combines the factual 
elements of both the Valcourt and Makarewicz cases. The record in the 
Dyken case disclosed a brutal and shocking murder. An "indescribably 
horrible photograph" 13 of the deceased lying on a mortuary slab was 
admitted into evidence. The defendant appealed from conviction 
of murder in the first degree without recommendation of mercy, and 
the conviction was reversed on the sole ground that the photograph 
was improperly admitted. The Court answered the contention of 
the state that the photograph, since it showed the location of the fatal 
shotgun wound, was properly admitted: 
The location of the wound was freely conceded and abundantly 
proved by other evidence. The photograph did not include any 
part of the locus of the crime and was too far in time and space 
therefrom to have any independent probative value. We agree 
with appellant that the introduction of this photograph in 
evidence could have no purpose or effect other than to inflame the 
minds of the jurors. We cannot say, in a first degree murder case 
without recommendation of mercy, that an error of this character 
and magnitude was not prejudicial.14 
Of course, an assiduous advocate could distinguish the facts of the 
Florida case and the two Massachusetts cases, but the requirement of 
"independent probative value" seems a stricter requisite for admissi-
bility of photographs than that they "aid the jury in understanding 
the issues," which is little more than a statement of the purpose of 
evidence in general. The Florida approach would seem to emphasize 
the possible prejudice to the defendant and to protect him even at the 
appellate level to the extent of reversing a trial court. 
The Makarewicz opinion stated, "In passing we pause to note that 
all the evidence was such as to indicate that the crime was committed 
with such extreme atrocity and violence that these slides could add 
little to inflame or prejudice the jury." 15 The Florida Supreme 
Court stated that "the record before us discloses a shocking and brutal 
crime." 16 No further comment was made as to the effect of such 
a crime on the issue of admissibility of photographs that are "indescrib-
ably horrible." 
The key difference between the two approaches is in the practical 
effect of the respective tests of each jurisdiction. The Massachusetts 
decisions place responsibility squarely on the trial judge to safeguard 
both the right of the Commonwealth to submit all relevant evidence 
and the right of the defendant to be free from unduly prejudicial 
and inflammatory material of slight probative value. Whatever the 
trial judge's ultimate decision in reconciling these conflicting rights, it 
1289 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1956). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15333 Mass. 575,584, 132 N.E.2d 294, 299. 
1~ 89 So.2d 866. 
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§12.2 CRIMINAL LAW III 
seems unlikely that he will be reversed on appeal. Therefore the wise 
Massachusetts practitioner seeking exclusion of photographs will em-
phasize in argument to the trial judge the balancing of interests in-
volved in admitting such photographs - pointing out, of course, their 
great prejudice and little relevance. The trial court needs all the 
help available in making a decision with such weighty consequences 
to the defendant. 
§12.2. Procedure in criminal cases: Strict application and its con-
sequences. During the 1956 SURVEY year, a number of serious criminal 
cases have been decided wherein the Supreme Judicial Court, at least 
purportedly, rested its decision on failure of counsel to observe proper 
procedural requirements. A review of these decisions should suggest 
to the practitioner the need for caution in handling procedural matters. 
Moreover, careful analysis of the cases raises the question whether the 
Court would allow substantial injustice in a criminal case despite 
improper procedural steps. 
In Commonwealth v. Riley1 the defendant, before filing a general 
plea of not guilty in the Superior Court, but after filing a general 
plea of not guilty in the District Court, filed a motion to quash and 
a plea in abatement. He alleged (1) that the District Court refused 
to allow him to cross-examine witnesses at the hearing on the issuance 
of process on the complaint and (2) that the judge who issued the 
complaint refused to disqualify himself from hearing the case. 
The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the action of the Superior 
Court in denying the motion and overruling the plea. The Court 
pointed out that the errors alleged by the defendant were not in the 
nature of formal defects apparent on the fact of process to which 
a motion to quash lies, and, if the defects were formal, even objections 
to formal defects cannot be taken for the first time in the Superior 
Court. The conclusion was that the defendant's objections were 
waived by the plea of not guilty in the District Court, in analogy with 
a line of cases where objections were raised to improper procedural 
methods by a grand jury in bringing in an indictment.2 
One of the analogous indictment cases cited explains the conclusion 
more fully: "At common law, matter in abatement must be pleaded 
before a plea of 'not guilty'; after such a plea it is too late to plead 
in abatement and the same rule applies to a motion to quash." 3 Thus 
it would seem that the rule is based on the technical distinction at 
common law between pleas in abatement and pleas to the merits.4 
§12.2. 1333 Mass. 414, 131 N.E.2d 171 (1956). 
2 Commonwealth v. Ventura, 294 Mass. 113, 120, 1 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1936); Common-
wealth v. Lombardo, 271 Mass. 41, 44, 170 N.E. 813 (1930); compare Lebowitch, 
Petitioner, 235 Mass. 357, 363, 126 N.E. 831, 832 (1920), with Comm<mwealth v. 
Harris, 231 Mass. 584, 121 N.E. 409 (1919). 
3 Commonwealth v. Lombardo, 271 Mass. 41, 44, 170 N.E. 813 (1930). 
4 The first appearance of this rule in criminal cases seems to be in Commonwealth 
v. Lewis, I Mete. 151 (Mass. 1840), wherein Justice Dewey said at page 152: " ... 
the allegation ... is a mere descriptio personae, or addition, and if erroneous as 
such the only remedy is by a plea in abatement. The plea of not guilty was a 
4
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Although the issuance of process, like the indictment, is only a 
preliminary step in the criminal process, a man's reputation is often 
irreparably affected even by preliminary steps through the application 
of the old adage "where there's smoke ... " His rights, therefore, 
should not be abridged by technicalities. But the procedures may 
be defended on the ground that when a case reaches the Supreme 
Judicial Court such damage is already done and the petit jury 
trial is not affected by the grand jury or by any other preliminary 
error.5 However, it is to be noted that the Court in the Riley case, 
before raising the procedural issue, fully discussed the merits of the 
defendant's contention and held that the defendant had no right to 
cross-examine. 
The defendant had contended that the statute gives the right to 
cross-examine, in its provision that when a complaint for a misde-
meanor is received, "the person against whom such complaint is made, 
shall ... upon request in writing, seasonably made, be given an 
opportunity to be heard personally or by counsel in opposition to the 
issuance of any process based on such complaint." 6 
The Court relied on legislative history, without citation, to reject this 
contention: "The statute, first enacted in 1943 in permissive form, 
gave a statutory basis for a practice sometime theretofore followed by 
the judge or clerk of allowing the attorney for the prospective de-
fendant to state relevant circumstances which might be thought to 
bear on the propriety of the issuance of process." 7 
Thus, whatever "opportunity to be heard" may mean in other 
contexts, no right to cross-examine is given by the phrase as used in 
G.L., c. 218, §35A. 
Objections to strict adherence to rules of procedure are more strik-
ing where, as in Newton v. Commonwealth,S a sentence of life im-
prisonment is involved. In the Newton case, petitioner sought, pro se, 
a writ of error on the ground that he was not properly represented 
by counsel. The new court-appointed counsel took only a single 
exception to the findings, rulings, and order for judgment of the 
single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, hearing the substitute 
waiver of all objections of this nature ... " The Court in the Lewis case cited no 
authority for this proposition in criminal cases, although the Attorney General 
cited 1 Chitty, Criminal Law 445-447. When considering this rule as applied to 
indictment cases as exemplified by Lebowitch, Petitioner, 235 Mass. 357, 363, 126 
N.E. 831, 832 (1920), holding that an objection to an indictment, on the ground 
that all the witnesses were in the grand jury room when each witness testified, 
could not be raised after a general plea to the indictment, it should be noted that 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 231 Mass. 584, 121 N.E. 409 (1919), held such objection 
was well taken when raised by a plea in abatement. 
5 See the suggestion in Commonwealth v. Ventura, 294 Mass. 113, 121, 1 N.E.2d 
30, 33 (1936), quoting Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Mass. 495 (1830): "If anything 
improper shall be given in evidence before the grand jury the error may be cor-
rected subsequently upon the trial before the petit jury." 
6 G.L., c. 218, §35A. 
7333 Mass. 414, 416, 131 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1956). 
S 333 Mass. 523, 131 N.E.2d 749 (1956). 
\ 
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petition. The Court, in effect, disposes of the petition III three sen-
tences: 
No attempt was made to point out any particular error on which 
the petitioner intended to rely. It is well settled as a matter of 
State practice that an exception of that sort is not valid and must 
be overruled. . .. This rule of practice alone requires that the 
exceptions be overruled, and we so hold.9 
The rationale of this requirement of particularizing the exception 
seems to be found in the opinions10 deciding that a single exception to 
a general finding does not raise the question whether the evidence 
warrants the finding,u unless the subsidiary facts on which the general 
finding is based are conceded or otherwise established,12 
These cases emphasize that questions of law and fact must be 
separated because no exception lies to a finding of fact.1s The point 
is also made that "An exception must call to the attention of the 
judge the particular errors alleged in order that if possible he may 
correct it. . .. [The] judge ... might have made further express 
findings of fact." 14 
This rule, while obviously proper and necessary in civil proceedings, 
could lead to injustice in criminal proceedings if a man's freedom is 
made dependent on the procedural competence of his counsel.15 This 
9333 Mass. at 524, 131 N.E.2d at 751, citing Matter of Loeb, 315 Mass. 191, 194, 
195, 52 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1943). 
10 Matter of Loeb, 315 Mass. 191, 52 N.E.2d 37 (1943); Sreda v. Kessel, 310 Mass. 
588, 38 N.E.2d 932 (1942); Stowell v. Hood, 288 Mass. 555, 193 N.E. 234 (1934). 
11 The proper way to raise this question is by an exception to the denial of a 
requested ruling that such a finding would not be warranted. Barton v. Cambridge, 
318 Mass. 420, 424, 61 N.E.2d 830, 833 (1945). 
12 Leshefsky v. American Employers' Insurance Co., 293 Mass. 164, 199 N.E. 395 
(1936). The reasoning of the Leshefsky rule is stated to be that "the separation of 
the questions of fact and of law involved thereon has been largely made." 
13 Sreda v. Kessel, 310 Mass. 588, 38 N.E.2d 932 (1942). Chief Justice Field says 
here that" ... it is a general principle of practice in such cases that an exception 
does not lie to a finding of fact by the judge since findings of fact are not subject 
to review, and, though questions of law are involved therein, there must be a sepa-
ration of such questions of law if they are to be reviewed ... although the gen-
eral findings for the plaintiff against the defendant doubtless apply rulings that 
such findings are permissible as a matter of law, it has been settled by many deci-
sions that 'an exception to such a finding is not sufficient to bring such an implied 
ruling before us for review." 
14 Matter of Loeb, 315 Mass. 191, 195, 52 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1943). 
15 Some states have reached the result of strictly applying this procedural rule by 
statute. For example, Texas requires that objections filed to a trial court's charge 
shall point out the specinc errors complained of. Otherwise the errors will not be 
considered on appeal. See Tex. Ann. Code Crim. Proc., art. 735 (Vernon, 1916). 
Prior to this enactment the Texas Court had relaxed this requirement when the 
trial court had committed a "fundamental" error in failing to charge as to the 
effect of certain testimony. Thornley v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. 1I8, 34 S.W. 264, re-
hearing granted, 35 S.W. 981, 61 Am. St. Rep. 836 (1896). But the statute is now 
strictly construed in criminal cases. Bell v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 61, 268 S.W. 168 
(1925); Taylor v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 174,230 S.W. 176 (1921). The Texas rule also 
seems to be followed in People v. Chapman, 281 III. App. 313 (1935); Graf v. State. 
6
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is particularly true when the exception seems to be on the ground that 
the findings and ruling were not supported by the evid.ence and the 
error is failure by counsel to request a ruling to that effect and except 
to its denial.16 While in a civil case justice delayed may be justice 
denied, that argument has no merit in criminal cases as a reason for 
not granting a new trial. But the Court, not content with such a 
curt dismissal, went on to say, "but in a case as serious as this it 
seems proper to add that in any event a careful examination of the 
record has disclosed no error." 17 The opinion then proceeds with a 
full discussion of the merits. 
""-. A third case is frightening, at least at first glance, and emphasizes 
the attention counsel must pay to statutory provisions dealing with 
periods within which various legal steps must be taken. In Common-
wealth v. Rodriquez18 the defendant, following his conviction for 
murder in the second degree, attempted to appeal under G.L., c. 278, 
§33B. That section provides that one desiring to appeal "shall, within 
twenty days after the verdict, file his claim of appeal." Defendant's 
counsel applied for and was granted two extensions of this time by the 
Superior Court judge. His appeal was filed within the extensions but 
more than three months after the verdict. The Supreme Judicial 
Court declared: "the time requirement within which an appeal may be 
taken under §33B is mandatory19 • . . and could not be extended 
either by consent of the parties or by the court. . .. It follows that 
the appeal is not rightly here and this court has no jurisdiction over 
the case." 20 Such treatment might be thought quite severe were it not 
for the final sentence of the opinion: "We might add that a careful ex-
amination of the record reveals no error in the conduct of the trial." 21 
In the Rodriquez case, a strict application of procedural rules be-
213 Ind. 661,14 N.E.2d 103 (1938); State v. Perretta, 93 Conn. 328,105 Atl. 690 (1919); 
Fraterrigo v. State, 151 Fla. 634, 10 So.2d 361 (1942). See also State v. Belcher, 121 
W. Va. 170, 2 S.E.2d 257 (1939), wherein a West Virginia statute similar to the Texas 
statute was interpreted as not applying to felony cases; and see People v. Visco, 272 
N.Y. Supp. 213, 241 App. Div. 499 (1934), wherein a new trial was granted because 
law and justice required it; both these cases reached a result contrary to the Texas 
interpretation. A view similar to that of New York has been taken in State v. Craig, 
9 N.J. Super. 18, 74 A.2d 617 (1950), and Parker v. State, 24 Wyo. 491, 161 Pac. 552 
(1916). 
16 The only criminal case cited by the Court in the Newton case was Common-
wealth v. Shea, 323 Mass. 406, 416,82 N.E.2d 511, 517 (1948), where the Court says, 
"At the conclusion of the charge the defendants stated that they excepted to so 
much of the charge as was inconsistent with their requests for rulings." Thus in 
that case defendant's ground for exception does not appear to be that the rulings 
were not supported by the evidence. Therefore the Newton case seems a substan-
tial extension of the doctrine in criminal cases. 
17 Newton v. Commonwealth, 333 Mass. 523,525, 131 N.E.2d. 749, 751 (1956). 
18333 Mass. 501, 131 N.E.2d 774 (1956). 
19333 Mass. at 502, 131 N.E.2d at 774. The Court cited Commonwealth v. Mc-
Knight, 289 Mass. 530, 538, 540, 195 N.E. 499, 502, 503 (1935); but in that case the 
problem was not complicated by the judge of the trial court granting the extension 
on motion by defendant. 
20333 Mass. at 502, 131 N.E.2d at 775. 
%1 Ibid. 
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comes even more disturbing. The failure to file an appeal within 
the time allotted, despite the trial judge's invitation to error by 
granting the" extensions, was held to deprive the court of jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction is a prerequisite to examination of the merits. Techni-
caIly, the court, having established that it had no jurisdiction, could 
not correct any error it found. 
However, it may be hoped that the Supreme Judicial Court has 
stated a principle in another case decided during the 1956 SURVEY 
year which furnishes possible means for overlooking procedural 
technicalities if injustice would result from strict adherence to them 
and which indicates a reason for the Court's careful notations that 
it had examined the merits and found no error. 
In Commonwealth v. Conroy22 the defendant tried to raise in the 
Supreme Judicial Court for the first time a question of error in his 
sentence. The defendant was found guilty on three indictments, one 
of which was attempted larceny. He was sentenced to three concurrent 
terms of from six to eight years. But the maximum sentence for 
attempted larceny is two and a half years. The Court reiterated the 
rule that a defendant may not raise a question of law for the first time 
in a brief filed in the Supreme Judicial Court.23 Despite this rule, the 
Court pointed out that "in appropriate instances this court has and will 
exercise the power to set aside a verdict or finding in order to prevent 
a miscarriage of justice when a decisive matter has not been raised at 
the trial." 24 
This broad statement, at least as a statement, certainly appears to 
cover a failure to properly except, and other cases so indicate.25 It 
may also be hoped that a court would consider it a miscarriage of 
justice where both a trial judge and counsel for defendant took steps 
they felt sufficient to save defendant's rights on appeal but the appeal 
was not within the mandatory time limit. This of course postulates 
that reversible error appears in the record and that the Court will 
assume jurisdiction despite its disclaimer in the Rodriquez case. 
Difficulties may arise, however, because the decisions cited by the 
Court, despite the broad language in the Conroy case, merely raised 
issues of exceptions improperly taken26 or lack of jurisdiction in the 
trial courts.27 Furthermore, while all the former decisions cited as-
sume such power, none finds sufficient warrant for its exercise. 
22333 Mass. 751,133 N.E.2d 246 (1956). 
23 Commonwealth v. Skalberg, 333 Mass. 255, 256, 130 N.E.2d 684, 685 (1955). 
24 Commonwealth v. Conroy, 333 Mass. 751, 757, 133 N.E.2d 246, 250. 
25 Commonwealth v. McGregor, 319 Mass. 462, 463, 66 N.E.2d 356, 357 (1946), 
which says, "It is assumed that in appropriate instances this court has and will 
exercise the power to set aside a verdict or finding in order to prevent a miscarriage 
of justice when a question affecting substantial rights has not been properly raised 
by exception at the trial"; Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 25, 140 N.E. 
470,476 (1923). 
26 Commonwealth v. McGregor, 319 Mass. 462, 463, 66 N.E.2d 356, 357 (1946); 
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 264 Mass. 324, 336, 162 N.E. 401, 402 (1928); Common-
wealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 23, 140 N.E. 470, 475 (1923). 
27 Commonwealth v. Andler, 247 Mass. 580, 142 N.E. 921 (1924). 
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The tone of the Court's language apparently indicates that much 
lies within the discretion of the Supreme Judicial Court.28 The lesson 
to be learned by the practitioner, however, is to be precise in proce-
dural matters. If through inadvertence, proper procedural steps are 
not taken, it would be worth while for counsel to argue that strict ad-
herence to procedural rules will result in such a miscarriage of justice 
as to appeal to the discretion of the Supreme Judicial Court.29 
§12.3. Evidence: Defendant's credibility, prior nol. prossed actions. 
An apparently novel and certainly interesting point is raised by 
Commonwealth v. Rondoni.1 The defendant in that case was con-
victed by a jury of abuse of a female child and appealed, assigning as 
error, among others, the submission to the jury of a document purport-
ing to be a record of his conviction in Connecticut of a crime. The 
document offered contained a statement that Rondoni had appeared 
to answer to an information by the state's attorney charging him with 
the crime of "assault, intent to kill, and theft";2 that he pleaded not 
guilty to each count; that these counts were no!. prossed; that the 
state's attorney, with the consent of the court, "filed an added third 
count charging carrying weapon [sic], and the prisoner for plea said 
'guilty' to said added third count." S 
The Court upheld the conviction. General Laws, c. 233, §69 pro-
vides: "The records and judicial proceedings of a court of another 
state or of the United States shall be admissible in evidence in this 
commonwealth [under certain conditions]." 4 General Laws, c. 233, 
§2l provides: "The conviction of a witness of a crime may be shown 
to affect his credibility ... " Here the judge allowed information to 
go to the jury which they were not entitled to see5 and which seems 
extremely prejudicial. The no!. prossed charges were much more 
serious than the count on which the defendant was convicted. The 
record might indicate that the defendant and the Connecticut state's 
28 The discretion is probably as broad as is that of the trial judge on motion for 
new trial where no exception to the alleged error has been taken. See Common-
wealth v. McKnight, 289 Mass. 530, 538, 195 N.E. 499, 502 (1935). 
29 Remedies other than the type discussed in this section may of course be avail-
able. See G.L., c. 250, §9 for possible use of the writ of error, and see the discussion 
of the scope of the writ of error in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law, §15.6. 
§12.3. 1333 Mass. 384, 131 N.E.2d 187 (1955). 
2333 Mass. at 385, 131 N.E.2d at 188. 
a Ibid. 
4 The conditions of G.L., c. 233, §69 are that the records be "authenticated by the 
attestation of the clerk or other officer who has charge of the records of such court 
under its seal." 
Ii The statute speaks of conviction. This provision has always been strictly con-
strued. In Boston v. Santosuosso, 307 Mass. 302, 330 30 N.E.2d 278, 296 (1940), the 
Court pointed out: "But there must be a ·conviction.' And whatever the word may 
mean in other connections, in this statute it imports a sentence." The Court has 
actually held: "The record ... was not admissible ... as it appeared the case was 
subsequently nol-prossed in the Superior court. It was not a conviction of the de-
fendant." Commonwealth v. Panton, 243 Mass. 552, 554, 137 N.E. 652, 654 (1923). 
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attorney had made some sort of an agreement that the defendant 
would plead guilty to the less serious count if the state's attorney nol. 
prossed the two more serious counts. 
Although the defendant was not convicted on the first two counts, 
their presence in the record could only indicate that he had been in 
serious trouble previously and this may have been an important 
factor in the deliberations of the jury. The judge, having admitted 
the whole record, told the jury to ignore the prejudicial part. There 
is no question that it is proper, in the judge's discretion, to allow a 
record of conviction to go to the jury room,6 and it may be conceded 
that decisions, too numerous to list, have held that prejudicial error 
is cured by instructions to disregard.1 
In Commonwealth v. Giacomazza,8 for example, where the defendant 
was charged with murder and where the jury was told to disregard 
certain harmful testimony, the Court said, "It must be assumed that 
the jury followed the instructions of the judge and disregarded this 
testimony ... " 9 
The point is that every trial lawyer knows that harmful evidence is 
rarely, if ever, disregarded. Once in the mind of a juror, it stays 
there. Granting that such evidence sometimes gets into a trial by 
accident, it seems unfortuate to permit its intentional introduction. 
This is particularly true in a case like Rondoni, where, as De-
fendant's Brief points out, "there are no material witnesses except the 
accuser and the accused, and consequently credibility becomes the 
sole issue." 10 
There is a statement in the case of Commonwealth v. Donarumall 
where the issue was whether the judge could refuse to send to a jury a 
complete indictment which indicated that a co-defendant of the pres-
ent defendant had been acquitted in a previous trial, which might 
seem to support the Supreme Judicial Court's position in this case. 
There the Court said: "It was discretionary with the judge either to 
deny the request of the defendant or to grant it with full instructions 
to the jury to disregard ... [certain portions] ... and to consider 
only what was charged in the second count." 12 The Rondoni opinion 
does not cite the language of this case. This may be because the actual 
holding was that there was no error when the trial judge detached 
certain portions from the indictment. The dictum indicating that the 
indictment could be submitted in toto, with instructions to disregard, 
6 The Court cites Forcier v. Hopkins, 329 Mass. 668, 672, llO N.E.2d 126, 128 
(1953), which in turn cites Portland v. Ruud, holding: "It was discretionary with 
the trial court whether the 'insurance papers' should be sent to or withheld from 
the jury." 242 Mass. 272, 276, 136 N.E. 75, 76 (1922). 
7 The Court in the Rondoni decision cites five cases for this proposition. 
8311 Mass. 456, 42 N.E.2d 506 (1942). This is the latest case cited by the Court 
and the quotation is paraphrased in the opinion. 
9311 Mass. at 465, 42 N.E.2d at 512. 
10 Defendant's Brief, p. 6. 
11260 Mass. 233, 157 N.E. 538 (1927). 
12 260 Mass. at 239, 157 N.E. at 540. 
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is further weakened by the only authority cited for it,13 which holds 
that a lower court record showing conviction could be submitted to the 
jury in the court to which appeal was taken. But the reason why such 
record can be submitted is that "inasmuch as no appeal can be taken 
from the judgment of the inferior court unless that court finds the 
accused guilty . . . the record of such finding, if sent to the jury, adds 
nothing to the knowledge of the jury ... "14 The record in the 
Rondoni case certainly added to the jury's knowledge. 
It may be noted that the Donaruma case allowed a judge to detach 
certain portions of the document sent to the jury; the obvious query is 
why was this not done here. Defendant's Brief states that the trial 
judge instructed the jury that "if it were possible to eliminate this 
from the records he would do so." 15 In the light of the Donaruma 
case, such was legally possible. Even if it were physically impossible to 
detach inadmissible parts because to do so would mar the admissible 
parts a method of partial masking should be available. If trial judges 
are to be allowed to admit such material intentionally, a clarification 
of the area of their discretion in tearing or masking portions might 
prove hel pfu!. 
§12.4. Possession of stolen goods: Effect on issue of knowledge. 
The defendant in Commonwealth v. Kelley1 was found in possession 
of stolen money under extremely suspicious circumstances fifty-four 
days after a robbery.2 The issue at his trial was whether the defendant 
received the stolen money, "knowing it to have been stolen." 3 The 
defendant introduced no evidence to explain his possession of the 
money. The trial judge charged the jury: "You may consider his 
possession of the stolen bills, if you find those bills that were in his 
possession to be part of the loot taken in the robbery, and his failure 
to account for how he came into possession of the bills on the issue 
as to whether he had guilty knowledge when he received the bills 
13 Commonwealth v. Wingate, 6 Gray 485 (Mass. 1856). 
14 Commonwealth v. Dow, II Gray 316, 317 (Mass. 1858). 
15 Defendant's Brief, p. 5. 
§12.4. 1333 Mass. 191, 129 N.E.2d 900 (1955). 
2 These circumstances included a voluntary reference to the robbery by the de-
fendant when an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation interviewed him 
three and a half hours after the robbery. After the money was found in his posses-
sion, the defendant refused to explain and challenged the FBI to think anything 
they wanted to. He admitted that the money had not come from his employment 
or from gambling, his only apparent sources of income. These circumstances seem-
ingly outweighed defendant's contention that fifty-four days was too long a lapse 
of time to be within the rule allowing an inference of guilty knowledge to be drawn 
from recent possession. See Commonwealth v. Montgomery, II Metc. 534, 537 
(Mass. 1846), for the suggestion that other evidence may be necessary in cases of a 
long lapse. Commonwealth v. Coyne, 228 Mass. 269, II7 N.E. 337 (1917), although 
not cited by the Court, holds that two months is not as a matter of law too long 
a lapse, and supports the Court's rejection of the defendant's contention. Other 
jurisdictions also hold that whether possession is recent depends on the facts of the 
case. See, for example, State v. Giardano, 121 N.J.L. 469, 3 A.2d 290 (1939); State 
v. Denison, 252 Mo. 572, 178 S.W.2d 449 (1945). 
8 G.L., c. 266, §60. 
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that they were stolen in the robbery." ~ Exceptions were taken to 
this portion of the charge and to the denials of a motion for a directed 
verdict and a requested charge that such possession could not be con-
sidered on the issue of defendant's knowledge that the property was 
stolen. 
The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the denial of the defendant's 
exceptions and held that "possession of recently stolen property puts 
the burden of explanation on one charged with having stolen it ... 
and the same principle applies to one charged with having received 
property knowing it to have been stolen." 5 
A point of interest to the bar is the meaning of the phrase "burden 
of explanation." The Massachusetts cases cited by the Court, although 
they speak in terms of sending the case to the jury in the absence of 
explanation of possession,6 do not use the term "burden of explana-
tion." 
The language of the opinion of the Court indicates that the jury 
may infer from the fact of possession the further fact of knowledge.7 
The language of the trial court's charge, although not quoted by the 
Court, also clearly indicates that the trial court did not require that 
an artificial force be given to a finding of possession, compelling the 
jury to find the requisite knowledge if they found possession.s The 
judge was allowing, not compelling, a finding. 
Other Massachusetts decisions are not free from ambiguity of phrase 
although their holdings seem clear. In Commonwealth v. Taylor9 the 
Court said, "but under our decisions the jury were to determine 
whether the proof offered was sufficient, in the absence of any expla-
nation, to raise a presumption sufficiently satisfactory to convince them 
of his guilt." 10 Despite the use of the term "presumption," its context 
indicates that no artificial compelling force was imposed on the jury. 
A presumption in its technical sense compels a finding. Hence, it 
cannot compel and at the same time allow the jury to determine 
whether it is "sufficiently satisfactory to them." Such language indi-
cates that what was meant was an inference.ll 
4 Record, p. 9. 
5 Commonwealth v. Kelley, 333 Mass. 191, 193, 194, 129 N.E.2d 900, 902. 
6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Taylor, 210 Mass. 443, 444, 97 N.E. 94 (1912). 
The trial court's charge spoke of "lack of explanation." Record, p. 9. The Kelley 
decision cited a federal case which discussed the effect of possession. Defendant 
"knew that the cars were stolen, and although it might have justified the inference, 
it compelled no finding to that effect, even thoug'h he failed to give a satisfactory 
explanation." McAdams v. United States, 74 F.2d 37, 41 (8th Cir. 1934). See also 
People v. Bardell, 388 Ill. 482, 58 N.E.2d 24 (1945); Pengleton v. Commonwealth, 
294 Ky. 484, 172 S.W.2d 52 (1943). 
7 The Court uses the word "inference" three times in the opinion. 333 Mass. 191, 
194, 195, 129 N.E.2d 900,902,903. 
8 " ... lack of explanation or unsatisfactory explanation of possession of recently 
stolen property, permits the jury to draw an inference of the essential element of 
that particular crime, of guilty knowledge ... " Record, p. 9. 
9210 Mass. 443, 97 N.E. 94 (1912). 
10 210 Mass. at 444, 97 N.E. at 94. 
11 See also Commonwealth v. McGarty, 114 Mass. 299, 302 (1873), where the Court 
uses the word "prewmption" and in the very next sentence uses the word "infer-
12
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The Court cites cases which sustain this position. In Commonwealth 
v. Peopcik,12 it is said: "It was nevertheless a question of fact for the 
jury to decide upon all the evidence, including the defendant's pos-
session of the stolen property and the inferences to be drawn from this 
circumstance, whether the defendant received the goods, knowing them 
to be stolen." 13 Decisions in other states have held that an inference 
and not a presumption should be drawn from the fact of possession 
to the fact of knowledge, though the term "presumption" is also loosely 
used.14 
Since the Massachusetts Court does not actually hold that there 
is a technical presumption arising from such possession it follows that 
such possession is not prima facie evidence of knowledge.15 Further-
more, since the jury merely "considers possession," 16 the fact finder 
may refuse to draw the inference of knowledge despite the absence of 
evidence that defendant had no knowledge. Therefore, the defendant 
has a "burden of explanation" only in a limited sense. To better his 
position with the jury, the defendant has the burden of introducing 
evidence. The "burden of proof" on the issue of knowledge is not 
shifted to the defendant.17 
An interesting question is raised by these observations. What would 
happen in a criminal case if counsel for the Commonwealth quoted 
directly from this opinion and asked the trial judge to charge that if 
the jury finds the defendant to be in recent possession of stolen prop-
erty the defendant has the "burden of explanation" of that posses-
sion? The ground for objection to such a charge would be that 
Massachusetts case law holds that possession justifies an inference of 
knowledge but has no other evidentiary effect. The term "burden 
of explanation" in a vacuum, defendant could argue, implies that 
more than inferential weight is to be given the fact of possession and 
ence." See 9 Wigmore on Evidence §2490 (3d ed. 1940) for the proper effect of a 
presumption and its distinction from an inference. 
12251 Mass. 369, 146 N.E. 661 (1925). 
13251 Mass. at 371, 146 N.E. at 662. See also Commonwealth v. Matheson, 328 
Mass. 371, 103 N.E.2d 714 (1952); Commonwealth v. Billings, 167 Mass. 283, 45 N.E. 
910 (1897); Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 11 Metc. 534 (Mass. 1846). 
14 A case cited in the Kelley opinion characterizes the relation between possession 
and knowledge as a presumption, as prima facie evidence, and as an inference-
all in the same paragraph. Wilkerson v. United States, 41 F.2d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 
1930). Another case cited specifically held: "It created at no time any presumption 
of law that the defendant knew that the cars were stolen, and although it might 
have justified the inference, it compelled no finding to that effect, even though he 
failed to give a satisfactory explanation." McAdams v. United States 74 F.2d 37, 41 
(8th Cir. 1934). See also Pengleton v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 484, 172 S.W.2d 52 
(1943), and People v. Bardell, 388 Ill. 482, 58 N.E.2d 24 (1945). 
15 See Cook v. Farm Service Stores, Inc., 301 Mass. 564, 17 N.E.2d 890 (1939), for 
a discussion of what constitutes prima facie evidence. One of its elements is an 
artificial legal force compelling the jury, i.e., in effect, it includes a presumption. 
16 The very nature of an inference, as distinct from a presumption, is that the 
fact finder mayor may not find. He is not compelled to find. See 3 Wigmore on 
Evidence §2490 (3d ed. 1940). 
17 "The burden of proof undoubtedly rested upon the prosecutor ... " Com-
monwealth v. Taylor, 210 Mass. 443, 444, 97 N.E. 94 (1912). 
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such a phrase is easily confused with the technical burden of proof. 
The similarity of these phrases, defendant would continue, might lead 
the jury to believe that the burden of proof on the issue of knowledge 
had shifted to the defendant. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§12.5. The wire-tapping problem. In 1952, the Law School of the 
University of Chicago received a grant from the Ford Foundation for 
the purpose of conducting a three-year research program in law and 
the behavioral sciences. In considering the problem of whether or 
not the jury conceives its function in the same way that the legal 
profession does, and to what extent, if any, it comprehends and fol-
lows the instructions from the trial judge, the directors of the program 
decided that it might be helpful to record some actual jury delibera-
tions. In connection with this experiment, the consent of Judge Del-
mas C. Hill of the United States District Court for the District of Kan-
sas was obtained. A set of rules governing procedure was formulated 
including provisions that permission of the judge, both counsel, and 
the United States Attorney, in any case where the federal government 
was a party, were conditions precedent; that only civil cases would 
be recorded; and that adequate safeguards would be maintained so 
that the identity of the jurors and the cases would remain secret. 
In the spring of 1954, recordings were made of five or six cases. The 
jurors were not notified that their deliberations were being recorded, 
but all the above safeguards were observed. 
When news of the recordings leaked out, public opinion both pro 
and con was expounded. The Subcommittee on Internal Security of 
the United States Senate held a hearing on October 12 and 13, 1955, 
to discuss the project's actions. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
Senators Eastland and Jenner pledged themselves to promote legis-
lation making eavesdropping of this nature a criminal offense. 
Acts of 1956, c. 48 is obviously the result of the publicity which 
followed the news of the experiment. The act adds Section 99A to 
G.L., c. 272. It provides that any attempt to overhear the delibera-
tions of a jury by use of a dictograph, dictaphone, or any similar 
device, with intent to procure any information relative to the conduct 
of such jury or any member, shall be punished by imprisonment for 
not more than five years or by a fine of not more than $5000, or both. 
By this rapid response of the General Court to the issue in question, 
the legislators have shown that they consider the benefits to be derived 
from such research to be outweighed by the probable consequences 
to the jury system as we know it today. Interestingly enough, how-
ever, the General Court rejected Senate Bill 624 which would have 
restricted the authority of the Attorney General and district attorneys 
to authorize wire tapping in criminal investigations. 
§12.fi. Criminal Information Bureau: Report required. Clerks of 
court must now, under 1956 legislation,l report convictions of certain 
§12.6. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 365. 
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crimes to the Criminal Information Bureau within the State Police, 
the creation of which was discussed in the 1955 ANNUAL SURVEy.2 
The subject matter of the crimes required to be reported include 
crimes involving gaming, drug and narcotic violation, sale or pos-
session of pornographic literature, or improper solicitation or use of 
funds for charitable purposes. The act also provides that the pro-
bation officer of the court must furnish to the clerk a description of 
the person convicted. 
§12.7. Changes in the probation system. The most important 
legislation bearing on criminal administration passed during the 1956 
SURVEY year was a continuation of the reorganization of the correc-
tional system of the Commonwealth, earlier stages of which were dis-
cussed in the 1955 ANNUAL SURVEy.1 Acts of 1956, c. 731 was based 
on recommendations in the message from Governor Herter trans-
mitting the second report of the committee appointed to study the 
correctional system.2 The suggestions it contained were crystallized 
in the bill 3 submitted by the House committee. This act makes im-
portant alterations in the probation system and correctional and parole 
changes are also incorporated. 
From the probation standpoint, probably the major structural change 
accomplished is the establishment of a Commissioner of Probation who 
is endowed with and given executive control and supervision of the 
probation service. Before this act was passed the administrative sys-
tem of probation in Massachusetts consisted of a Commissioner of 
Probation and a Board of Probation. The Commissioner's powers 
were very limited; furthermore, he was appointed by the Board, served 
"during the pleasure" of the Board, and received such salary as the 
Board should decide. The new legislation abolishes the Board of 
Probation and gives the Commissioner the authority which the Board 
previously had, in addition to some new powers.4 A Committee on 
Probation is established to assist the Commissioner in coordinating 
the entire probational system.5 
The term of appointment of the Commissioner is set at six years, 
to which term he is appointed by the Committee on Probation. His 
salary is fixed at $12,000 a year. As a result of this new Section 19 
the Commissioner is no longer dependent on the discretion of some 
other administrative body for the amount of his salary or for the 
length of his term of appointment. 
2 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.20. 
§12.7. 11955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§12.l-12.l2. The new acts may be found in 
G.L., c. 276, §§83-103. 
2 This was the Wessell Committee, consisting of Nils Y. Wessell, President of 
Tufts University; Joseph E. Ragen, Warden, Illinois State Penitentiary; Will C. 
Turnbladh, Executive Director, National Probation and Parole Association; Robert 
J. Wright, Assistant General Secretary, The American Correctional Association and 
the Prison Association of New York. 
3 House No. 3245. 
4 Acts of 1956, c. 731, §19. 
1\ Id. §21. 
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Under the new law no person can be appointed as probation officer 
unless his or her qualifications have been examined by the Commis-
sioner and approved by him as meeting the standards established by 
the Committee on Probation.6 Prior to the enactment of Chapter 731 
there was no necessity whatsoever for obtaining the approval of the 
Commissioner before appointing a probation officer. 
The Commissioner may also recommend the appointment of addi-
tional probation personnel. Although the recommendation is subject 
to the approval of the court to which the recommendation is made, 
the individual case load assigned to each probation officer may be 
controlled by adoption of the Commissioner's recommendations. 
In addition to those powers of the Committee on Probation pre-
viously discussed, some of its other major duties include: the estab-
lishment of standards for the appointment of the Commissioner of 
Probation and the probation officers, and the fixing of salary schedules 
for probation officers. 
As a result of this legislation the policies of probation and the ad-
ministration of these policies have become more uniform under a 
centralized system. Such an arrangement is deemed more desirable 
than the previous system under which divergent standards and policies 
were adhered to and administered by the various courts throughout 
the Commonwealth. The trend toward a more centralized system is 
readily perceivable in this act of the legislature. For example, whereas 
formerly a probation officer had to meet only the standards thought 
sufficient by the individual judge who appointed him, under the 
new system all applicants must measure up to a specified statewide 
standard established by the Committee on Probation, and the Com-
missioner must approve all applicants as having met the established 
standards before they can be appointed.7 Another improvement ac-
complished by this new legislation, as put into effect, is the raising of 
the quality of probation officers through stringent qualifications, estab-
lished by the Committee on Probation. An applicant for the position 
of probation officer must have a bachelor's degree from an accredited 
college or university plus one year of experience in case work or in 
teaching or in personnel work; or, as a substitute for experience, he 
must have one year in a graduate school of social work.8 
In general, the new legislation makes great strides toward improv-
ing the quality of probation work in Massachusetts. 
6Id. §§13, 14. 
7Id. §13. 
8 These standards were not specifically set out in the drafting of this act. The 
establishment of such standards was left to the discretion of the Committee on 
Probation. However, the qualifications listed constitute the standards which have 
been established by the Committee on Probation in the exercise of their discretion. 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1956 [1956], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1956/iss1/16
